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Abstract
Changes and Challenges in Air Force Approaches to Space
Launch Procurement

U.S. Air Force approaches to meeting military space launch needs have
undergone significant changes over the past 15 years, evolving definitely, and at times,
fitfully. But the future approach remains undefined and recent events have called into
question previously accepted basic assumptions.
This paper briefly reviews the Air Force’s past approach to space launch
procurement, how and why it changed. The paper describes the current approach planned
by the Air Force and new dilemmas associated with it.
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Changes and Challenges in Air Force Approaches to Space
Launch Procurement
By Robert Wayne Eleazer, III

U.S. Air Force approaches to meeting military space launch needs have undergone
significant changes over the past 15 years, evolving definitely, and at times, fitfully. But the
future approach remains undefined and recent events have called into question previously
accepted basic assumptions.
When space launch programs began in the late 1950’s the Air Force employed a
procurement approach driven both by the R&D nature of the new systems and by traditional
aircraft-style contracting methods. The booster airframes were procured under one contract, the
engines and rocket motors under other contracts, and avionics under others usually all from
separate contractors.
Under this approach, government design control of the hardware was nearly total and
close oversight of contractor activities was the norm. Even relatively minor design changes could
not be made to flight hardware, software or even Ground Support Equipment (GSE) without the
approval of the Air Force System Program Office (SPO). Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)
were used to control the configuration of the hardware, and Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) reviews confirmed system configurations. The SPOs conducted their own
evaluations of contractor actions and recommendations, and the Aerospace Corporation not only
supported the SPO activities but did first hand examinations of hardware and even conducted

modeling and simulations in such arcane and esoteric areas as rocket engines and guidance
software.
At the launch base, additional Air Force contracts supplied base support and range
services and the Air Force launch organizations, acting as the SPOs’ field arms, supplied their
own oversight and control as well as complete safety oversight of all phases of processing and
launch activities. Although occasionally chafing under the Air Force-imposed restrictions and
controls, the major space contractors accepted the management approach and adapted their own
organizational structures to handle the implications.
This management approach was pretty much the way it was for approximately twentyfive years, until in the mid-80’s two new factors forced a change. The first was the downdirected dominance of the Space Shuttle for launch of Air Force systems, the second was the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984.
In the early 1970’s it became official Federal Government policy that the Space Shuttle
would be used for all U.S. Government missions and that Shuttle launch services would be
offered at discount prices to commercial satellite companies. This policy effectively put
expandable boosters on notice that they would be going out of business; it did not appear there
were enough commercial missions to support a separate launch industry. Less obvious was the
fact that the Air Force would have to devote large amounts of technical manpower to supporting
Shuttle operations, in particular at Vandenberg AFB, CA. When the Air Force made the decision
in 1984 to procure ten heavy lift expendable launch vehicles to complement the Space Shuttle’s
capabilities, a new, streamlined contracting and management approach was needed; this effort
became the Titan IV program
The Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) was another factor the Air Force had to
consider. Previously, launch of commercial payloads had been accomplished under existing
government contracts with the launch companies. The CSLA put an end to this practice;
companies would handle such work directly. The difficulty was that the companies were not set

up to do so. There existed no history of commercial relationships between the booster
manufacturers and the suppliers of engines and other components; the companies traditionally
had managed their interface with the Air Force rather than every aspect of the entire program. In
essence, continuance of the traditional Air Force SPO management techniques were seen as an
impediment to U.S. companies’ ability to serve the commercial market.
What made competitiveness so urgent was the emergence of Arianspas’ Ariane launch
vehicle as serious contender in the international commercial marketplace. In the mid-70’s experts
sneered at the Ariane as hopelessly behind the U.S. capability, even if it worked. But the
government-enforced abandonment of future U.S. expendable systems gave Ariane an
opportunity, and the French company fully exploited it. The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger
in January 1986 gave Arianespas a foot in the door.
All of these factors drove the Air Force to a new approach for the Complementary
Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) even before the Titan IV booster was selected to fill the
need. A prime contractor approach was chosen, with component and subassembly acting as
suppliers to the prime rather than as associate contractors under an Air Force SPO. One contact
would be issued, to include not only production of all hardware, but its integration, launch
operations, and construction of launch facilities. Furthermore, to help offset the decreased Air
Force control and oversight a concept called Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR)
was developed. Essentially, TSPR gave the prime contractor the responsibility for making it all
work rather than the government SPO.
In the case of the Titan IV program, the prime contractor approach was seen as essential
to posturing U.S. firms for commercial competition, but also had the theoretical advantage of
reducing Air Force program office manpower requirements. All of this occurred at a time when
the military build-up of the 80’s was making increasing demands on Air Force manpower.
However, for Titan IV the Air Force also essentially reinvented an old and largely
discredited procurement approach: Total Package Procurement (TPP). TPP was used on the C-

5A and AH-56 programs in the 60’s and left everyone involved with a bad taste in his mouth.
Nonetheless, by buying Titan IV as a package, rather than in individually evaluated phases, what
was essentially TPP was used once more. The reasoning was basically the same as used in the C5A program; the technical challenges were relatively minor and industry could be trusted to
handle things with less government involvement.
Following the loss of the Challenger, the prime contractor concept was applied to
procurement of the boosters used to replace the Space Shuttle for Air Force missions. In fact,
there was a distinct evolution to the Air Force approach. The Titan II and Delta II used the same
prime contractor and TSPR approach as Titan IV did. The Atlas procurement to support launch
of Defense Satellite Communications (DSCS) Program satellites went one step further, with no
procurement of launch hardware as such; instead launch services were procured - essentially a
delivery service to orbit. For the last of the procurements, the small launch vehicle contract
which led to the Pegasus , the Air Force took a further step back and was less involved in
hardware design and operations than ever before. Despite the pro-active stance taken by the Air
Force, this transition was not without controversy. By 1989, elements in the launch industry were
voicing their opinion that Air Force contractual control was still too extensive and led to greatly
increased costs. In response to congressional interest in the topic, including proposed legislation
that would have mandated commercial-style procurement, the Air Force indicated that it
envisioned a spectrum of procurement practices. The Air Force stated that high value and
nationally critical missions would be subject to a greater degree of control than less critical
payloads, with low-cost R&D scientific missions such as those on Pegasus receiving the least
degree of oversight. There would be no universal one-size fits-all approach to launch capability
procurement.
As for Titan IV, the post-Challenger challenges imposed on the program probably
invalidated the program’s Total Package Procurement approach. The program had to almost
instantaneously meet an enormous increase in number and types of payloads, missions that had

been pulled off of the Space Shuttle. The huge increase in types and numbers of missions (over
400%) enormously complicated the program, but it was too late to return to the more traditional
approach.
By the late 1980’s a new factor had to be taken into account for launch procurements:
“Operationalization” of Air Force space launch capabilities as advocated by Air Force Space
Command. Space Command took over the launch bases at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg in
October 1990 and began to advocate procurement, operations, and logistics support approaches
which would “normalize” launch operations, using Air Force aircraft operations as a model.
Even replacement of contractor launch crews by military launch teams was suggested.
The net result of all of these conditions, factors, and initiatives was a major clash of
concepts. Air Force Space Command wanted greater control and involvement in launch
operations. Commercial launch firms generally wanted less Air Force control, although their
opinions varied as to how urgent a concern this represented. The TSPR concept was integral to
the prime contractor approach, but was disliked by Air Force Space Command due to the
requirement to vest greater responsibility in the private firms and less in the Air Force launch
organization. Congress generally still advocated more “commercial like” procurement and even
imposed such an approach on NASA as part of appropriations legislation. And the Air Force
SPOs had to figure out how to make everyone more or less happy and obey the law.
While these controversies raged, the U.S. Navy went a step beyond everyone else in the
government and adopted a delivery to orbit approach for the Ultra High Frequency Follow-On
(UFO) series of communications satellites. Rather than procuring the satellites and then
depending on the Air Force to procure the required launch services, the Navy chose to procure the
satellites on a ”delivery to orbit” basis. The satellite contractor, Hughes, procured the launch
services commercially in essentially the same manner as typically is done for commercial
comsats. If the launch failed, the Navy would pay nothing, but government oversight designed to
help ensure mission success would be greatly reduced as well. As the DoD lead for space launch,

the Air Force opposed the Navy’s approach; among other things it would eliminate the bundling
of procurements which could reduce procurement costs. The Air Force pointed out that the Navy
approach was more costly than using an Air Force SPO, but would be cheaper if at least two
launch failures occurred. As it turned out, the first Navy UFO mission did fail during launch.
The Navy did not have to pay for the mission failure, but didn’t get the services it desired, either.
Subsequent UFO missions were successful.
Meanwhile, as all of the theoretical arguments were being tossed about, U.S. commercial
launches grew in number, and in the mid-1990’s first equaled and then passed government
launches in annual rate. This was to have a profound impact on future government procurement
approaches.
The Air Force started a new launch vehicle program to replace the cancelled National
Launch System and Advanced Launch System; it was entitled Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV). EELV started out as a program designed around the concepts of
Operationalization and its logistics equivalent, Normalization, including increased involvement
by military personnel, and with relatively little consideration given to commercial requirements.
After much discussion at various levels in the Pentagon, there appeared to no real way to
practically or legally incorporate uniquely commercial requirements into an Air Force program.
But as the truth about anticipated commercial versus predicted military launch rates became
known, it became obvious that the EELV program would not be successful in meeting Air Force
space launch requirements unless it also was commercially successful.
In the fall of 1997 the Air Force suddenly announced some radical changes to the EELV
program. There would be no downselect to one bidder; development of both the Lockheed
Martin and Boeing designs would be funded. Furthermore, the Air Force would step back from
direct involvement in EELV launch activities and allow the private firms much greater control
and responsibility. This was a dramatic change in direction, but the attendant impacts were even
more significant. The private firms would be given full responsibility for and exclusive rights to

all dedicated facilities. As time proceeded, the concept was further developed, and plans were
made to phase out the Air Force launch squadrons, and dramatically reduce the available launch
base and range services currently provided either free or at cost by the Air Force launch wings.
Details are still being worked out, but it is obvious that the approach being spearheaded by the
EELV program will define new ways of doing business for numerous aspects of launch
operations and contracting. Even these radical changes potentially are merely the first step in
eventually adopting a Delivery to Orbit approach for all missions, both government and
commercial. One size fits all was back.
The latest concern that has been raised is reliability. What kind of success rate can be
expected under the new commercial-style procurements? From the middle of 1998 to mid-1999,
three out of four Titan IV missions launched failed, and these were procured under the original
concept which reduced government oversight but which is still far beyond the insight approach of
EELV. Over the same period of time, the first two Boeing Delta III missions failed, as did a
Lockheed Martin Athena launch. The Delta III and Athena are boosters developed as purely
commercial ventures with less government involvement than any other current vehicle; as such
they herald the future. Six failures in a year’s time is not only disturbing, it is unprecedented
since the R&D days of the 1960’s. In contrast, during the 1985-86 timeframe a total of only four
launch failures caused near-panic in the launch industry. It has been assumed that the demands of
the commercial marketplace would drive the launch firms to attain equal or better reliability as
achieved under close government oversight. This assumption must now be questioned.
One valid reaction after any such series of failures is to question the procurement
methods used. Based on past experience, a typical response would be to increase oversight of the
contractors, an appaoch which flys in the face of plans to reduce government involvement.
It would be easy to conclude that increased government oversight is required, but the
recent failures don’t necessarily support that conclusion. Government missions, with a degree of
oversight in place, failed, as did commercial missions with no such external oversight. Certainly

the decreased government involvement planned for EELV must be called into question. Despite
this, the return to the close control of ten years ago is probably not feasible for variety of reasons,
the most significant of which is the reduced amount of skilled manpower available to the Air
Force. The demands of worldwide deployments are stressing the Service’s capabilities. Despite
the acknowledged importance of military space capabilities, it would be very difficult for the Air
Force to forgo missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Middle East in order to ensure
the success of an industry in which it is a minority user. This situation is exacerbated by the
congressional direction in the early 1990’s to significantly scale back the Aerospace
Corporation’s manpower.
The Air Force now finds itself in something of a dilemma, partially of its own making
and partially a result of a radically changed economic and international environment. What space
launch procurement approach is optimum for either low cost or high confidence in mission
success may well be irrelevant; the determining factor is what can be accomplished given
capabilities, resources, priorities, and expectations.

